Acquiring Jurisdiction of Infant Defendants under the Indiana Law by Boyd, Alan W.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 4 Article 3
1-1928




Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation




ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OF INFANT DEFENDANTS
UNDER THE INDIANA LAW
The problem of getting infant defendants into court and bind-
ing them by judgments and decrees has seemed to puzzle mem-
bers of the bar and nisi prius courts in Indiana from the early
period of our judicial history up to the present time. It is, of
course, elementary that an infant cannot defend in person or
by attorney but only by a guardian ad litem. The power to ap-
point such guardians for infant defendants inheres in all courts
of justice.1 In addition the authority is expressly conferred
by statute in Indiana. Section 266, Burns' R. S. 1926, provides
that:
"An infant defendant shall appear and defend by guardian appointed
by the court or chosen by such infant with the consent of the court."
It is also provided by Section 3423, Burns' R. S. 1926, that:
"All courts shall have power to appoint a guardian ad litem to defend
the interests of any minor impleaded in any suit, and to permit any per-
son, as next friend, to prosecute any suit in any minor's behalf."
A guardian ad litem is properly appointed although the in-
fant has a regular guardian appointed by the same court and
living in the same jurisdiction. 2 However, the regular guardian
may appear and defend, and if so no guardian ad litem need be
appointed. 3
From Hough v. Canby (1846)4 to Voyles v. Hinds (1916)5
persistent attempts have been made to dispense with service of
summons for minor defendants by the expedient of having a
guardian ad litem appointed, who has proceeded either to waive
service upon his ward, or to file an answer ignoring the lack of
service. There seems to have been some sanction for such a
procedure in the earlier English Chancery Practice, at least
where no personal judgment against the infant was sought.6 All
I Gibbs v. Potter, 166 Ind. 471, 475; Mackey v. Grey, (1807) 2 Johns
(Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 192; Co. Litt. 89n, 16; Field, Law of Infants, p. 153.
2 Alexander v. Frary, 9 Ind. 481. s
3Makepeace v. Bronnenberg, 146 Ind. 243; Garrigus v. Ellis, 95 Ind.
598; Hughes v. Sellers, 34 Ind. 337; Harrison v. Western Construction Co.,
41 Ind. App. 6.
4 8 Blackf. 301.
5 186 Ind. 38.
6 Sloane v. Martin, 24 N. Y. S. 661, aff. 40 N. E. 217.
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such attempts under our practice, however, have proved abor-
tive and it has uniformly been held that the courts have no juris-
diction to appoint a guardian ad litem until the infant has been
brought into court by the service of process upon him in some
manner known to the law.7 Such appointments and judgments
rendered which are based thereon are nullities and ineffective
for any purpose.
Service of process upon the infant being a necessary step,
the question is what service is necessary. Many states have
distinct statutory requirements for service of process upon in-
fants. Some require service upon the father, mother, or gen-
eral guardian in addition to service upon the infant. Some re-
quire personal service as distinct from substituted or construc-
tive service. There is no Indiana statute concerning service
differentiating between infant and adult defendants. Section
333, Burns' R. S. 1926, provides that:
"The summons shall be served, either personally on the defendant or
by leaving a copy thereof at his usual or last place of residence ......
The word "defendant" is certainly broad enough to include
infants. Nevertheless the idea is prevalent among members of
the bar that an infant must be served personally, and that serv-
ice by leaving a copy is invalid. There is no Indiana decision
justifying such a contention.8 Bu neither is there any decision
which satisfactorily answers it.
There are a number of Indiana decisions which state that
process must be served on infants in the same manner as if they
were adults.9 Examination of these authorities discloses that
in none of them did the court have under consideration the man-
ner of serving process upon infants. They are all cases where
7Hough v. Canby (1846), supra; Robbins v. Robbins (1850), 2 Ind.
74; Babbitt v. Doe (1853), 4 Ind. 355; Doe v. Anderson (1854), 5 Ind. 33;
Peoples v. Stanley (1855), 6 Ind. 410; Wells v. Wells (1855), 6 Ind. 447;
Martin v. Starr (1855), 7 Ind. 224; Pugh v. Pugh (1857), 9 Ind. 126;
Alexander v. Frary (1857), 9 Ind. 481; Grey v. Pierson (1863), 21 Ind. 18;
Abdil v. Abdil (1866), 26 Ind. 287; Hawkins v. Hawkins (1867), 28 Ind.
66; De La Hunt v. Holderbaugh (1877), 58 Ind. 285; Carver v. Carver
(1878), 64 Ind. 194; Roy v. Rowe (1883), 90 Ind. 54; Voyles v. Hinds
(1916), supra; Holiday v. Miller (1901), 28 Ind. App. 121; Harrison v.
Western Constritotion Co. (1907), 41 Ind. App. 6.
8 Watson's Rev. of Works Pr. and Forms, Vol. 1, Section 890.
9 Hough v. Canby (supra); Babbitt v. Doe, supra; Doe v. Anderson,
supra; Peoples v. Stanley, supra; Martin v. Starr, supra; Pugh v. Pugh,
supra; Alexander v. Frary, supra; Abdil v. Abdil, supra; Hawkins v. Haw-
kins, supra; De La Hunt v. Holderbaugh, supra; Harrison v. Western Con-
struction Co., supra.
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there was no service of any kind upon the infants, and the fore-
going statement taken with the background which appears in
the cases, can be given no stronger meaning than that infant
defendants as well as adults must be served with process. No
authority in Indiana passes upon the question of whether in-
fants can be served by leaving a copy at their last and usual
places of residence. Authorities elsewhere, however, clearly
suggest the answer.
In Bryan v. Kennet,10 it was contended that the statute au-
thorizing notice to defendants by publication did not include in-
fants. The court held that since the statute did not by its terms
except infants, it applied to them as well as to adult defendants.
In Steinhardt v. Baker," in determining whether the provision
of the statute for substituted service was applicable to infants,
the court said:
"The words 'any defendant' were certainly broad enough to include
infants, and, as the statute made no exception as to them, we think it
applied to infants as well as adults."
Other authorities have construed similar statutory provisions
in the same way.12 So far as the "due process" requirement is
concerned it has been said that:
"Notice in some form to an infant is essential to confer jurisdiction
upon a court to bind his property. But the legislature may prescribe that
it be constructive, instead of actual; and proceedings in conformity with
such a statute will be valid and bind the infant."' 3
Under the language of our statute and the rule of construc-
tion adopted by these authorities, there seems to be no question
but that service by copy upon infants is valid in every respect.
The infant having been properly brought into court by the
service of summons, a guardian ad litem can be appointed and
the matter proceed in the regular way. A further question is
raised, however, by the frequent practice of having a guardian
ad litem appointed as soon as summons is served and the pro-
ceeding completed before the return day. Is a judgment so se-
cured binding upon the infant? There is little authority directly
in point and none in Indiana.
In Rice v. Bolton,14 it appeared that in a prior action a guar-
dian ad litem had been appointed and a judgment rendered
20 113 U. S. 179, 288, Ed. 908.
11 (N. Y.) 57 N. E. 629.
12 Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.), 30 N. E. 612; Hale v. Hale (Ill.), 33 N.
E. 858; Cohen v. Portland Lodge, 152 N. W. 357.
13 Smith V. Reid (N. Y.), 31 N. E. 1085.
14 (Ia.) 100 N. W. 634.
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against the infant after service of summons, but the day be-
fore the return day. It was held that the judgment was not void
and was impervious to collateral attack. No direct authority was
cited, but the court reasoned that jurisdiction of the person of
the minor was acquired by service of the summons, and that
since the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem at all is merely
an irregularity and does not invalidate the judgment, and since
the entry of judgment by default after service but before the
time allowed for appearance is also regarded as an irregularity,
the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the rendering 6f
judgment before the return day was merely irregular. The
court said:
"The same rule is applicable to a judgment against an infant. It might
have been corrected during the term by any person who chose to interest
himself in the infants' behalf on the day or thereafter during the term
he was required to appear by a friend, or possibly by an amicus Curzae.
Nothing of the sort was done, and the record was subsequently approved.
It cannot now be attacked collaterally."
The analogies upon which the Iowa court relied are recog-
nized by the Indiana decisions. It has been held several times
that the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant
who has been actually served with process does not invalidate
the judgment so as to render it open to collateral attack but is
only an irregularity.' 5
It has also been held where there has been service of sum-
mons, a judgment rendered by default before the return day is
merely irregular and not void.16
It seems clear in view of these decisions that the Iowa case
would be followed in Indiana, and that a judgment against a
minor secured upon the appointment of a guardian ad litem
before the return day could not be attacked collaterally. Doubt-
less such a judgment would be set aside and the infant permitted
to defend as a matter of course, as suggested in the Iowa case,
if he or someone in his behalf sought to have it done during
the term. Under what circumstances could a direct attack be
made thereafter? Any later direct attack would be governed
by Section 423, Burns' R. S. 1926, which provides that:
"The court shall relieve a party from a judgment taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect on com-
plaint filed and notice issued, as in an original action, within two years
from and after the date of the judgment."
15 Blake v. Douglass, 27 Ind. 416; McBride v. State, 130 Ind. 525; Cohee
v. Baer, 134 Ind. 375.
16 Essig v. Lower, 120 Ind. 239; Friebe v. Elder, 181 Ind. 597.
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Under this section minors have two years after coming of
age to make application to be relieved from judgments so
taken.17 In order that a plaintiff may avail himself of this pro-
ceeding, however, it is essential that a meritorious defense be
shown in addition to excusable neglect.18 If excusable neglect,
etc., exists together with a meritorious defense, the regularity
of the proceeding does not prevent it from being set aside. On
the other hand in the absence of a meritorious defense the ir-
regularity alone would not be a ground for setting aside the
judgment.19
ALAN W. BoYD.
Of the Indianapolis Bar.
17 Macy v. Lindley, 54 Ind. App. 175; Wiser v. Mast, 149 Ind. 177.
18 Macy v. Lindleyj, supra.
19 Cohee v. Baer, supra.
